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MEMBERSHIP CLAUSE OF THE SMITH ACT HELD TO
CARRY RIGID STANDARDS OF PROOF
Hellman v. United States
298 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1961)
John Hellman was indicted and tried for violation of the Smith Act of
1940.1 This act provides a criminal penalty for anyone who "becomes or is
a member of, or affiliates with any such society, group, or assembly of per-
sons [who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of
any government in the United States by force or violence], knowing the
purposes thereof .. ."2 At the trial, the Government introduced evidence
of Hellman's exceedingly active career as a member of the Communist
Party. Hellman had served as an organizer of youth camps and other front
organizations, participated in the underground and recruited new members.
He had also taught extensively in Communist Party schools urging his stu-
dents to participate in elections to learn of their futility in achieving party
goals and generally to advance the conditions necessary for the success of
the Communist movement. On the basis of this evidence, Hellman was con-
victed.
On appeal, the proceedings were delayed until final Supreme Court deter-
mination of Scales v. United States.3 In that case, the Supreme Court decided
that the membership clause of the Smith Act did not violate the first amend-
ment to the Constitution and that it had not been replaced by section 4(f)
of the Internal Security Act of 1950.4 The Scales case, along with Noto v.
United States5 decided in the same term, established certain prerequisites for
conviction under the membership clause of the Smith Act. In applying these
standards the Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient to establish
the necessary element of specific personal intent to bring about the violent
overthrow of the Government as speedily as circumstances would permit. As
a result, the Court reversed the conviction. 6
The Scales case was the first in which the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of the membership clause. An earlier case, Dennis v.
United States,7 upheld the constitutionality of the advocacy clause of the
Smith Act.8 The constitutional issue of whether Congress could punish
1 54 Stat. 671 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).
2 Ibid. The statute punishes violation with fines up to $20,000 and imprisonment up
to 20 years.
3 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
4 64 Stat. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783(f) (1958).
G 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
6 Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1961).
7 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
8 Smith Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 670, 18 U.S.C. § 2385: "Whoever knowingly or willfully
advocates, abets, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing
or destroying the government of the United States .... 
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
innocent teaching of the desirability of forceful overthrow of the government
was not decided as those particular defendants were found to have specifically
intended to bring about violent revolution. The question of whether or
not specific intent is an essential element of the crime was left open. The
question was settled in the Scales case where the Supreme Court read the
requirement of specific intent into the membership clause and added the re-
quirement that the membership be "active." This element was included to
avoid "close constitutional questions" as it was reasonable to infer that
Congress did not mean to inflict heavy penalties on mere passive members.
The Court also applied the strict evidentiary standards developed in Yates
v. United States To convict under the membership clause of the Smith Act
the Government must prove two basic propositions. The jury must find that
"(1) the Communist Party advocated the violent overthrow of the Govern-
ment, in the sense of present 'advocacy of action' to accomplish that end as
soon as circumstances were propitious and (2) petitioner was an 'active:
member of the Party, and not merely a 'nominal, passive, inactive or purely
technical' member, with knowledge of the Party's illegal advocacy and
specific intent to bring about violent overthrow 'as speedily as circumstances
would permit.' "10D
The Noto case reversed a conviction under the membership clause on
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the first
proposition, the illegal advocacy of the Communist Party. The Court held
that the evidence of illegal advocacy must "be imputed to the Party as a
whole and not merely some narrow segment of it.""
In the principal case, however, the Court of Appeals concentrated on
the question of Hellman's personal intent to bring about the violent over-
throw of the government as speedily as circumstances would permit. For
this purpose, the court assumed that the evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish the Party's illegal advocacy and that Hellman was an active member
with knowledge of the Party's illegal intentions. This in itself might be
enough to draw a reasonable inference of personal intent if the Party had
only illegal activities and illegal ends. However, there was evidence showing
the Party also engaged in legal activities, e.g., advocating racial integration
and nuclear disarmament. The specific intent could also have been inferred
from the nature of Hellman's activities if the only conclusion which could
have been drawn was advocacy of action to bring about the violent over-
throw of the present government. As an example of activities that leave only
the conclusion of illegal intent, the Court mentioned the collection of arms
and ammunition and planning specific acts of sabotage. Another legitimate
source for evidence of illegal intent would be Hellman's own statements. This
9 354 U.S. 298 (1956). Although this case dealt only with the advocacy and con-
spiracy clauses of the Smith Act, the Court held in Scales that the evidentiary standards
applied to all provisions of the Act.
10 Scales v. United States, supra note 3, at 220.
11 Noto v. United States, supra note 5, at 299.
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was the principal mode of proof in the Scales case,' 2 but the court in the
principal case found the record void of any statements from which an in-
ference of Hellman's personal illegal intent could be fairly drawn. Moreover,
Hellman's activities were such that they were equally consistent with an
intent to reach the Party's ends through peaceful means.
In cataloguing the patterns of evidence from which illegal advocacy
could be inferred, the court conspicuously omitted one of the principal pat-
terns established in the Yates case and reiterated in Scales. Illegal advocacy
was shown in those cases by evidence of the "teaching of forceful overthrow,
accompanied by a contemporary, though legal, course of conduct clearly
undertaken for the specific purpose of rendering effective the later illegal
activity which is advocated."' 3 Evidence of Hellman's activities as listed in
the Court of Appeals' opinion would seem to fit this standard. If the Party's
criminal advocacy is assumed, then Hellman's teaching in party schools,
urging students to participate in elections to learn of their futility in achieving
ends, and urging activity which would hasten the crises necessary for Com-
munist revolution seem to be excellent examples of conduct legally under-
taken to render effective the illegal aims of the Party. Also, by establishing
a dichotomy of legal and illegal activities, the court seems to be naively
ignoring the fact that there are many legal organizations working for the
same legal goals as the Communist Party. It appears odd that an individual
would knowingly participate in an organization that advocates the violent
overthrow of the government to achieve peaceful ends. In effect, the Party's
legal ends are not ends at all so far as the Party is concerned, but are means
for creating the economic and social chaos that is essential to the real Com-
munist goal of revolution. 14 An active, knowing member would be sub-
stantially contributing to that goal no matter what his personal intentions
might be. From the plain meaning of the membership clause it would appear
Congress intended to reach such activity. Whether or not Congress can con-
stitutionally punish legal activities undertaken with the intent to achieve
legal ends because of the probable contributory effect on creating conditions
necessary for violent overthrow of the government is still an open question,
but these three cases, Scales, Noto and Hellman, demonstrate just how far
federal courts will go to avoid such "close constitutional questions" that
might necessitate declaring an act of Congress unconstitutional.15
Although the Scales decision severely narrowed the membership clause
12 Scales v. United States, supra note 3, at 255: "... [Tihe elements of petitioner's
'knowledge' and 'specific intent' require no further discussion of the evidence beyond
that already given as to Scales' utterances and activities."
13 Yates v. United States, supra note 9, at 332; Scales v. United States, supra note
3, at 232.
14 Hoover, Masters of Deceit 184 (1956). The Communist Party members are
told, "Use anything to advance the ultimate goal: offensive and defensive tactics, legal
and illegal, long and short range policies. All are part of the over all battle plan."
15 See Communist Party, U.SA. v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389 (1961). This case,
decided the same day as the Scales case, is another example of narrow construction to
avoid constitutional questions. See also Note, 23 Ohio St. LJ. 767 (1962).
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by reading in the requirements of specific intent and active membership, the
case was criticized because the Court did not clarify the amount of activity
or the type of activity required.16 This lack of clarification would permit
either a moderately active or highly active member working only for legal
ends to be convicted under the membership clause. A desire to correct this
weakness seems to be reflected by dictum found in the Noto case. Although
it was not necessary to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence of petitioner's
personal intent, the Court said that the element of personal intent must be
judged stictissimi juris to avoid prosecution of a member who is in sympathy
with the legitimate aims of the Party, but who has no intention of resorting
to force to attain them. 7
The Court of Appeals, in the principal case, combined this dictum with
the Scales test and now places an overwhelming burden of proof on the
Government to gain a conviction under the membership clause of the Smith
Act. The Government must first prove that the organization to which the
defendant belongs as a whole advocates the violent overthrow. The "as a
whole" requirement would seem to imply that a showing of substantial
legitimate Party activities would prevent a finding of the essential element
of illegal advocacy. If this barrier can be surmounted, the United States
must then prove that the particular defendant was an active, knowing member
with specific personal intent to overthrow the Government by force. The
element of specific intent can only be inferred from the defendant's own
incriminating statements or from activities as extreme as the storing of
arms or planning sabotage. Since activities of this kind could probably be
successfully prosecuted under other federal statutes which do not impose
such a staggering burden of proof,'8 the courts may now have interpreted
the membership clause of the Smith Act so narrowly that it has lost its in-
tended effect.
Although the desirability of this extreme example of judicial braking
might be questioned, the result is not without merit. Prior to these three
cases, the membership clause had been severely criticized on several grounds
and was widely thought to be unconstitutional. It was felt that its infringe-
ment of the right of association was not justified by the necessity, prac-
ticality or usefulness gained in combating internal communism.' 9 Feeling was
16 See Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 111 (1961).
17 Noto v. United States, supra note 5. The distinction between legal and illegal
activities is not without judicial precedent. In De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1935),
the Supreme Court held that to punish one who assists in the conducting of a lawful
meeting held by an illegal organization was unconstitutional.
18 Section 4 of the Internal Security Act, 64 Stat. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783 (1958),
prohibits conspiracy to perform acts which would substantially contribute to the establish-
ment of a totalitarian dictatorship in the United States. This provision eliminates ad-
vocacy of force or violence as an essential element of the crime.
Sections 18-21 of the same act provide rather comprehensive espionage laws. Also,
it was noted in Scales that the evidence would have been sufficient to support a conviction
under the advocacy clause of the Smith Act, supra note 8.
19 Comment, "Communism and the First Amendment: The Membership Clause of
the Smith Act," 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 527 (1957).
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also expressed that although criminal prohibition is within congressional
power, it is a totally inadequate means for dealing with the Communist
movement.20
The Internal Security Act of 1950 may be a more desirable means of
control. The primary requirement of this act is that Communist organiza-
tions must register with the Attorney-General, enabling the Government to
identify and keep track of socially dangerous groups.2 ' The constitutionality
of this provision was recently upheld.22 The Supreme Court, however, avoided
as premature a constitutional attack on the statute, i.e., that registration
under the Internal Security Act would amount to self-incrimination under
the membership clause of the Smith Act 2 3 If, when enforcement is attempted,
the Party's officers and members can successfully invoke this fifth amend-
ment protection, the value of that statute will be lost. The judicial con-
struction of the membership clause in the Hellman case may well prove to be
the solution to the problem of a vacuum that would be created if the fifth
amendment defeated the operation of the Internal Security Act. The almost
impossible burden of proof the Government must meet limits the applica-
tion of the membership clause to hard-core revolutionaries who are actively
engaged in preparation for physical violence. While it might be remembered
that the fifth amendment protects against coerced admissions which only
tend to incriminate, the tendency to incriminate by registering under the
Internal Security Act might be balanced by the unlikelihood of prosecution
under the membership clause and the security interest in the exposure of
Communist activities. An anology might be drawn to the requirement of
registration and disclosure of certain records under the Tax Power. Although
there is the possibility of self-incrimination resulting from such disclosures,
20 Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Dennis v. United States, supra note 7, at
532: "I add that I have little faith in the long range effectiveness of this conviction
to stop the rise of the Communist movement. Communism will not go to jail with these
Communists."
21 Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 787 (1958). Once
the Party has registered, section 10 of the act makes it a criminal offense to broadcast or
use the mails without identifying the source. This statutory scheme, designed for exposure
rather than prohibition, seems more desirable as most Communist activities are carried
on through "front" organizations. Many are created by the Party; others are legitimate
organizations that have been infiltrated. Through the use of fronts the Communist Party
has many unknowing members working for the Communist cause. Areas most prone
to infitration are communications, labor, under-privileged minorities, education, religion,
youth, and government.
Philbrick, I Led Three Lives 164, 240-44, 249-50 (1952); Ernst and Loth, Report on
the American Communist 42 (1952).
22 Communist Party, U.S.A. v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1
(1961).
23 Although § 4(f) of the Internal Security Act, supra note 4, provides that registra-
tion can not be used as evidence in a subsequent prosecution, the Party contended that
disclosure would open the way for further investigation to gather admissible evidence.
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the Government's interest in the collection of revenue precludes the fifth
amendment from preventing the enforcement of revenue legislation.2 4
If the membership clause of the Smith Act is a major bar to the effective
operation of the Internal Security Act, the acquittal of John Hellman might
well serve as the judicial precedent for denying the Communist Party, its
officers and members, the privilege against self-incrimination when they balk
at complying with the registration provisions of the Internal Security Act.
24 See McCormick, Evidence 283 (1954). See also United States v. Kahriger, 345
U.S. 22, 32-33 (1953): "Under the registration provisions, a person subject to the tax is
not compelled to confess to acts already committed; he is merely informed that in order
to engage in the business of wagering in the future he must fulfill certain conditions."
